

















CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3220 











An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 









This paper investigates competition between health insurance companies under different 
financing regulations. We consider two alternatives advanced in recent German health care 
reform discussions: competition by contribution rates (health contributions) and by fees 
(health premia). We find that contribution rate competition yields lower company profits and 
higher consumer welfare than premia competition when switching between insurance 
companies is costly. 
JEL-Code: I11, I18, D43. 








Technical University Dresden 
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1 Introduction
Budgetary pressures arising from demographic change and medical progress place the debate
about suitable strategies for cost containment in public health care continuously on top of the
policy agenda in most industrialized countries. The situation in Germany delivers a showcase
in that respect, because the German health care system uses comparatively much resources
to produce only average results in international comparison (OECD, 2008).1
From an economic perspective, the promotion of competition suggests itself as a solution. In
fact, many advisors perceive the problems of health insurance as problems of an uncompet-
itive environment and consequently argue in favor of a strengthening of market forces - see
Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim BMF (2004) and OECD (2008) as characteristic examples for
that view.
Income-dependent contributions to health insurance are commonly viewed as an obstacle to
the workings of free markets. Therefore, the proposal to enhance competition is often accom-
panied by the suggestion to replace income-related contributions by uniform fees, so-called
health premia. It is frequently argued that the concomitant removal of income redistribu-
tion from health insurance would kill two birds with one stone: on the one hand, both the
excess burden of the implicit income tax and the overconsumption of health services due to
distorted price signals would be removed. On the other hand, competition between insurance
companies would intensify and customer expenditures would be lower, because insurants face
stronger incentives to switch to more advantageous contracts (Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim
BMF, 2004; OECD, 2008). This view - inspired by the Swiss system - has inﬂuenced recent
changes in German health care (Richter, 2009).
While the ﬁrst part of this argument has been discussed thoroughly in the literature, the
ﬁnding being mixed ﬁndings once compensation for the income losses of poorer households
is accounted for (Breyer & Hauﬂer, 2000; Buchholz, 2005; Fehr & Jess, 2006; Schubert &
Schnabel, 2009), its second part is often alluded to (Buchholz, 2005; Fehr & Jess, 2006,
Richter, 2009) but goes virtually unexamined. To the best of our knowledge, there is no
theoretical analysis of the competitive virtues of contribution/tax rates versus user fees;
neither in the health care context nor from a general perspective. The existing strand of
literature adressing the choice of taxes versus fees focusses almost mostly on political economy
aspects and/or the provision of public goods and does not touch on competition issues (B¨ os,
1980; Fraser, 1996; Swope & Janeba, 2005). This is also true for Kifmann (2005) who
discusses the political economy of income-related contributions in the realm of health care.2
1 See Fehr and Jess (2006) and Richter (2009) for surveys on the German debate.
2 Vaithianathan (2006) discusses interactions between health insurance and health care markets, allowing
for imperfect competition in the latter. However, health insurance is assumed to be perfectly competitive
and any role of its mode of ﬁnancing is blurred as all households have identical incomes.A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 2
On the empirical side, Cutler & Reber (1998) identify a substantial competition eﬀect from
a shift from income-related to uniform health plan employer subsidies for Harvard University
employees. However, they do not delve into a detailed analysis of strategic interactions
in pricing decisions between insurance companies.3 In a recent paper, Frank & Lamiraud
(2009) challenge the above-mentioned claim that competition necessarily improves consumer
choice in health insurance. Using Swiss data, they ﬁnd price diﬀerences to be persistent and
switching to cheaper insurance plans to be weak. However, they do not address the question
to what extent switching decisions are aﬀected by ﬁnancing mechanisms.
This gap in the literature is somewhat surprising, as it is far from obvious that the imple-
mentation of health premia is a prerequisite for competition. Competition by contribution
rates is equally conceivable and has to some extent been operated in Germany albeit under
tight regulations.
The present paper is a ﬁrst attempt to address this gap. In a simple stylized duopoly model,
we examine how consumers fare when insurance companies compete by setting either health
contributions proportional to income or uniform health premia. Interestingly, our plain anal-
ysis does not provide support for the eﬃciency argument for ﬁnancing health insurance by
premia. While the question of premia versus contribution competition turns out to be virtu-
ally irrelevant when customers are inﬁnitely reactive to price diﬀerentials, contribution rate
competition leads to lower aggregate health insurance expenditures and hence higher con-
sumer welfare when demand inertia is considered. This result is grounded in the fact that
contribution rate competition renders richer individuals the favorite customers of insurance
companies, as they pay higher prices for medical insurance. However, by the same token,
richer people react also more sensitively to contribution rate diﬀerentials than poorer peo-
ple. The attempt to attract high-income persons induces a strong incentive for insurance
companies to mitigate contribution rates.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic structure of the model. Section
3 analyzes both fee and contribution rate competition with an inﬁnitely reactive demand,
whereas Section 4 considers loyal consumers reacting sluggishly on price diﬀerentials. Section
5 provides some extensions and Section 6 concludes.
3 Moreover, However, the applicability of their ﬁndings is limited by the imperfect analogy between removing
income-related subsidies and removing income-related contributions.A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 3
2 The Model
Consider an economy populated by a large number of individuals with total mass of one.
Persons diﬀer with respect to gross income according to an income distribution characterized




. Let µ =
R y
y yf(y)dy denote mean (=aggregate) income,
while σ is the variance. These variables determine the squared coeﬃcient of variation of the
income distribution: svc = σ/µ2.
Each individual faces a risk of illness π, in which case a damage c arises. We assume that
this risk is the same for every person, that is, it is uncorrelated to income. This assumption
will be relaxed in the Extensions Section.
There are two health insurance companies A and B which compete for their customers either
by setting health premia pi or health contribution rates τi with i ∈ {A,B}. In accordance
with important characteristics of the German and Swiss Health Insurance Systems, we posit
that insurance is compulsory for all persons and that insurance providers have to accept every
customer, that is, there is an obligation to contract. Moreover, state authorities prescribe the
extent of treatment in case of illness. As a useful benchmark, we stipulate that the treatment
has to compensate for the whole personal damage. To simplify the exposition, the respective
cost is assumed to amount to c as well.
Due to these features, all individuals are fully insured and insurance companies face to-
tal treatment expenditures of π · c. Consequently, the sum of consumer expenditures and
producer proﬁts in the health insurance market amounts to total treatment cost −π · c, irre-
spective of contribution rate or fee levels. Hence, every equilibrium in the health insurance
market is Pareto-eﬃcient: it is impossible to improve the situation of any market participant
without harming another. However, these equilibria diﬀer in terms of the division of gains
between insurers and insured on the one hand and the insured on the other hand. In the
following analysis, we address both issues by considering two separate indicators: consumer
expenditures, the total payments by the insured and consumer welfare, the sum of resulting
individual utilities. More precise deﬁnitions of the measures follow below.
3 Competition with Perfectly Reactive Customers
This section addresses competition between insurers when customers are inﬁnitely reactive,
that is, they switch providers immediately whenever this creates the slightest utility gain.
We start with the case of fee competition, then turn to contribution rate competition and
ﬁnally compare the equilibria.A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 4
3.1 Health Premia
Suppose that both insurance companies oﬀer full insurance in exchange for premia pA and
pB, respectively. Then, the expected utility of a person with income y choosing company i
is:
π · u(y − c − pi + c) + (1 − π) · u(y − pi) = u(y − pi), (1)
where u(·) is the strictly concave individual utility function.
Since the beneﬁts in case of illness are regulated to be equal for both companies, preferences
over both oﬀers are determined by cost considerations: the individual chooses A over B with
certainty when pA < pB and vice versa. For equal fees, the person is indiﬀerent.4 Hence,
depending on the levels of the premia, the share of people with income y choosing company






1 : pi < pj
1
2 : pi = pj
0 : pi > pj
, (2)
where g = (pA,pB) is the vector of premia and j 6= i denotes the competing company.
Then, the proﬁts for insurance company i are:
Z y
y
[pi − π · c]dP
i (y,g)f(y)dy. (3)
Proposition 1. In the premia competition equilibrium with perfect customer mobility, both
insurance companies set their premia equal to expected treatment cost: pA = pB = p∗ = π · c.
Company proﬁts are zero.





pj − ε : pj > π · c
pj : pj = π · c
pi > pj : pj < π · c
. (4)
This gives the unique equilibrium: pA = pB = π · c, where both companies have 50% of the
households as their customers and make no proﬁts. .
This Bertrand-result is due to the inﬁnitely high reactiveness of customers. Because all
insured switch to the cheaper company, each insurer has a strong incentive to undercut the
4 To simplify the exposition, we abstract from any problems arising from negative incomes due to health
premia exceeding personal gross income. Doing so strengthens the case for premia.A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 5
competitor whenever the expected treatment cost can still be covered. Competition drives
fees down to expected treatment cost and all proﬁts are eradicated.
3.2 Contribution Rates
When health insurance is funded by income-related contribution rates, an individual with






It is straightforward that each individual chooses the company with the lower rate whenever
it exists and is indiﬀerent otherwise. As a consequence, the share of persons with income y






1 : τi < τj
1
2 : τi = τj
0 : τi > τj
, (5)
with τ = (τA,τB) as the vector of contribution rates. Proﬁts are:
Z y
y
[τiy − π · c]dR
i (y,τ)f(y)dy. (6)
Proposition 2. In the health contribution rate equilibrium with perfect customer mobility,
both insurance companies set their contribution rates equal to the share of expected treatment
cost to average income: τA = τB = τ∗ = π · c/µ. Company proﬁts are zero.





τj − ε : τj > π · c/µ
τj : τj = π · c/µ
τi > τj : τj < π · c/µ
. (7)
Hence, there is a unique equilibrium: τA = τB = π · c/µ, where revenue equals expected
treatment expenditures. Q.E.D.
Again, the ﬁerce competition drives proﬁts down to zero. A situation with positive proﬁts
for a company can not constitute an equilibrium as the competitor would have an incentive
to capture total demand by oﬀering a marginally lower contribution rate.A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 6
3.3 Comparing Equilibria
We are now in the position to compare the resulting equilibria. As mentioned above, two
measures will be used: consumer expenditures CE and consumer welfare CW. The ﬁrst mea-
sure CE is concerned with the division of the surplus between insurants and insurers. Since
consumer expenditures and company proﬁts always add up to −p·c, consumer expenditures
equal company revenues. Hence we have:
CEP = p∗, CER = τ∗µ (8)
for fees and contribution rates, respectively.
Consumer welfare CW, however, explicitly considers the distribution of consumer expendi-




u(y − p∗)f(y)dy, CWR =
Z y
y
u((1 − τ∗)y)f(y)dy. (9)
Proposition 3. With perfect customer mobility, health premia and health contribution rates
competition yield identical results in terms of total consumer expenditures. However, con-
sumer welfare is higher with health contributions.
Proof. The ﬁrst statement follows immediately from the fact that company proﬁts are zero in
both equilibria. Hence revenues must be same and so have to be total consumer expenditures.
The distribution of these expenditures among households is uniform for fee competition and
progressive for contribution rate competition. With diminishing marginal utility of income,
the sum of utilities is higher under contribution rate competition. Q.E.D.
As a ﬁrst outcome, we ﬁnd that the current setup does not deliver an argument in favor of
premia rather than contribution rates competition. Both types of competition impose the
same total cost on the insured, while contribution rates are preferable from a distributional
perspective. However, this preference is merely grounded in the fact that no other instruments
for income redistribution are at hand. Allowing for an additional proportional income tax
would easily allow fee competition to reproduce the level of consumer welfare achieved with
contribution rate competition. In that case, the mode of competition would be irrelevant for
all market participants and hence for society.
5 The utilitarian formulation is for convenience only. All results go through for arbitrary positive degrees of
inequality aversion.A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 7
4 Competition with Loyal Customers
It is well known that immediate switching serves rather as a useful theoretical benchmark
than as a good description of actual customer behavior. Instead, substantial price diﬀerences
seem to go hand in hand with a low intensity of changing providers - see Frank & Lamiraud
(2009) for respective evidence for the Swiss Health Care System. Therefore, we revisit the
issue of fee and contribution rate competition in a setting where consumers are imperfectly
reactive to price diﬀerentials. For this purpose, we introduce customer loyalty to the analysis.
Apart from that, we proceed like in the precedent section: considering premia competition
ﬁrst, we then turn to contribution rate competition and ﬁnally compare.
4.1 Health Premia
We assume now that individuals diﬀer not only with respect to income, but also along a
second dimension labelled customer loyalty. This loyalty or attachment is modelled as a
personal cost experienced from not being insured by the favorite company.
As this loyalty is meant to reﬂect personal characteristics unrelated to income, we assume
the distributions of loyalty and income to be uncorrelated. To ﬁx ideas, deﬁne the cost λ
as as the loyalty for company A over company B and take it to be uniformly distributed
in the interval

−¯ λ, ¯ λ

, ¯ λ ≥ 0 for each income level. Hence the probability that a person
with income y has the cost λ is 1/(2¯ λ). The higher ¯ λ, the higher the dispersion of customer
loyalties. As the distribution has a zero mean, loyalties are symmetrically distributed between
both companies: all other things equal, one half of individuals prefers A over B whereas the
other half prefers B over A.
Obviously, loyalty aﬀects demand also in the presence of fee diﬀerences: A person with income
y chooses insurer A when u(y − pA + λ) > u(y − pB), which is tantamount to:
λ > pA − pB,
that is, his loyalty for A is stronger than the premium diﬀerential. Taking care of the support
of the loyalty distribution, we arrive at the following expression for A’s markets share among




   
   
1 : pA < pB − ¯ λ
¯ λ − (pA − pB)
2¯ λ
: pA ∈ [pB − ¯ λ,pB + ¯ λ]
0 : pA > pB + ¯ λ
, (10)
whereas ˜ dP
B(y) = 1 − ˜ dP
A(y). The proﬁt of company i is given by:A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 8
Z y
y
[pi − π · c] ˜ dP
i (y)f(y)dy. (11)











f(y)dy = 0. (12)
In what follows, we concentrate on symmetric equilibria.
Proposition 4. In the symmetric premia competition equilibrium with customer loyalty,
premia equal a markup on expected treatment cost which depends positively on the dispersion
of switching costs:
pA = pB = ˜ p = π · c + ¯ λ. (13)
Proof. In the symmetric equilibrium, we have ˜ dP
i = 1/2 and
∂ ˜ dP
i (y)
∂pi = − 1
2¯ λ. Using these
expressions in (12) gives:
1
2





f(y)dy = 0. (14)
As
R y
y f(y)dy = 1, that condition becomes: 1 − (pi − π · c)/2¯ λ = 0, which is solved by (13).
Q.E.D.
Condition (12) shows the tradeoﬀ between positive and negative marginal eﬀects of raising
the fee level. The positive eﬀect - called extraction eﬀect in the sequel - accrues because higher
premia generate more revenue from the customers. The negative eﬀect - called erosion eﬀect
in the sequel - is the reduction in proﬁts due to the loss of customers. This erosion eﬀect is the
weaker, the more dispersed switching cost are. Thus, equilibrium premia depend positively
on ¯ λ.
4.2 Contribution Rates
Consider now the case where insurance companies compete by health contributions. The
preference of a person with income y of A over B is now reﬂected in the condition:
λ > (τA − τB)y (15)
As above, A is preferred by everyone whose degree of loyalty exceeds his diﬀerence in health
insurance expenditures. However, this diﬀerence varies among people as it depends on per-
sonal gross income. Payments being proportional to income, any given contribution rate
diﬀerential aﬀects high income earners stronger than low income earners.A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 9




   
   
1 : τA < τB −
¯ λ
y
¯ λ − (τA − τB)y
2¯ λ









Inspection of (16) shows that this market share is income-dependent for moderate contribu-
tion rate diﬀerentials: Among people with equal income, the proportion choosing A decreases
in y when τA > τB and increases when τA < τB. Intuitively, the higher income, the higher
the ﬁnancial sacriﬁce of choosing the more expensive provider and hence the lower the loy-
alty actually expressed towards that company. By the same token, richer people are more


















Taking this behavior into account, companies maximize:
Z y
y
[τiy − π · c] ˜ dR
i (y)f(y)dy, (18)











f(y)dy ≤ 0, (19)
with equality when (18) is positive. This expression can be interpreted analogous to (12).
The ﬁrst term denotes the positive extraction eﬀect, the higher revenue generated from the
customer base. The second term measures the erosion eﬀect, that is the reduction of proﬁts
due to the reduction of the customer base. Obviously, the proﬁt reduction can be decomposed
in a reduction of revenue and cost, respectively.
Proposition 5. In the contribution rate equilibrium with switching costs, contribution rates
equal the share of expected treatment cost to average income, if the squared coeﬃcient of
variation of the income distribution exceeds the ratio of maximum loyalty to expected treatment
cost. Otherwise, contribution rates exceed the share of expected treatment cost to average
income by a markup depending positively on the dispersion of loyalty cost and negatively on
the squared coeﬃcient of variation:
τA = τB = ˜ τ =

    














. (20)A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 10
Proof. In a symmetric equilibrium, we have: ˜ dR





2¯ λ from (17). Hence,
for
R
(τiy − π · c)˜ dR








(τy − π · c)
y
2¯ λ





















Because the second moment of the income distribution equals the sum of the variance and
the squared mean: Z y
y
y2f(y)dy = σ + µ2 = µ2(1 + svc),
(21) can be written as:
¯ λ + π · c
µ
= τ(1 + svc), (22)
However, (22) renders (18) negative whenever svc > ¯ λ/π ·c. In that case ˜ τ = π ·c/µ. Q.E.D.
Aﬀecting both the extraction and the erosion eﬀect, the shape of the income distribution
becomes contentious for equilibrium contribution rates. The extraction eﬀect is proportional
to average income because a marginal increase in the contribution rate collects a inﬁnitesi-
mally higher income share from all customers. The erosion eﬀect is inﬂuenced by the higher
sensitivity of richer people to contribution rate increases and can be disentangled into im-
pacts on revenue and cost. On the one hand, the cost savings due to the shrinking number
of customers are proportional to average income in our setup. On the other hand, the loss
in revenues is more than proportional, because not only the reduction of the customer base
but also the revenues per insurant increase in income. That’s why the second moment of
the income distribution and hence the squared coeﬃcient of variation come into play. As an
increase in that coeﬃcient increases the relative strength of the revenue component of the
erosion eﬀect, contribution rates are driven down to a zero-proﬁt equilibrium when income
inequality is suﬃciently high.
4.3 Comparing Equilibria
How do the two equilibria compare regarding consumer expenditures and consumer welfare?
The following proposition gives a clear-cut answer.
Proposition 6. Whenever there is income inequality, health contribution competition leads
to lower consumer expenditures and higher consumer welfare than premia competition.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition behind this result is simple: compared to premia competition, contribution rate
competition shifts the focus of companies towards richer individuals because they are theA Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 11
more lucrative clients. However, these clients also react more sensitively on contribution rate
increases. This renders health contribution competition ﬁercer: both companies moderate
their claims in order not to put the high-income insurants oﬀ.
This intuition is easily substantiated by considering the relative strengths of extraction and
erosion eﬀects. Take the case of a degenerate income distribution (svc = 0) as the starting
point. For such a distribution, the distinction between premia and contribution competition
is meaningless. So both modes of competition yield identical results, as can be seen by
comparing (13) and (20) for svc = 0.
Introducing income inequality by a mean-preserving spread of the income distribution has no
eﬀect on premia competition for neither extraction nor erosion eﬀects are income-dependent.
However, things are diﬀerent with contribution rate competition. While the extraction eﬀect
is proportional to mean income, the erosion eﬀect is strictly convex in income. Hence income
inequality emphasizes the negative erosion eﬀect relative to the positive rent eﬀect. Therefore
insurance company proﬁts must be lower under contribution rate competition whenever the
income distribution is not degenerate. These lower proﬁts translate into lower consumer
expenditures. As contribution rate competition also reliefs poorer households, it also delivers
higher consumer welfare.
5 Extensions
In this section, we discuss the robustness of the results with respect to three possible exten-
sions.
5.1 Income Ceilings
Some countries limit public health insurance to a subset of the population. For example, in
Germany only persons with an income below a threshold are mandatory members of public
health insurance.
Spillovers in insurance company pricing decisions for persons above and below that threshold
being unlikely, allowing for such an income ceiling would not aﬀect our results.6 Our ﬁndings
do not depend on the precise shape of the income distribution and would hence be reproduced
with a respectively truncated distribution.
6 Spillovers could only arise if the average treatment cost increases in the number of clients. However, this
would aﬀect pricing decisions also in the absence of income ceilings.A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 12
5.2 Income-Related Risks
We have assumed that the risk of illness is the same for every person. However, one salient
ﬁnding of the literature is that income and health are positively correlated (van Ourti et
al., 2009). Allowing for this correlation strengthens our results because it increases the
attractiveness of richer customers to insurance companies.
To be precise, let π(y) denote the probability of illness for a person with income y, with
π0(y) < 0 and ¯ π =
R y
y π(y)f(y)dy as the average risk of illness. Leaving individual decision
patterns unaltered, this modiﬁcation aﬀects insurance company proﬁts. With health premia,
the proﬁt of company i amounts to:
Z y
y
[pi − π(y) · c] ˜ dP
i (y)f(y)dy. (23)











f(y)dy = 0, (24)
which in a symmetric equilibrium is solved by g = ¯ λ + c · ¯ π. For contribution rate competi-
tion, proﬁt is
R y
y [τiy − π(y) · c] ˜ dR











f(y)dy = 0, (25)
with the symmetric solution:
τ =





Contribution rate competition leads to lower customer expenditures than premia competition
when g > τµ. This condition is tantamount to:
σ






π(y)yf(y)dy − c¯ πµ2 = c · µ
Z y
y
[π(y) − ¯ π]yf(y)dy (26)
The left hand side of that expression is non-negative and positive whenever the income
distribution is non-degenerate. The right hand side of (26) is non-positive and is negative
whenever illness risk decreases in income - see the Appendix for details.7 Hence, the inequality
in (26) holds and contribution rate competition is superior to fee competition. As stated
above, this ﬁnding is rooted in an even more intense competition for high income earners for
they are more likely to be net contributors for insurance companies.
7 For income-independent risks, the right hand side of (26) is zero, hence the inequality is fulﬁlled. See the
Proof to Proposition 6.A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 13
5.3 Partial Insurance
The full insurance of risks assumed hitherto is typically prevented by problems of moral
hazard. While we will not engage in a detailed incorporation of asymmetric information to
the model, we now consider a setting where not the full damage, but only γ < c is covered
by health insurance. Again, we focus on the case with customer loyalty.




y − pA + γ − c + ˜ λP

+ (1 − π) · u

y − pA + ˜ λP

= π · u

y − pB + γ − c






While there is no closed-form solution for ˜ λP, we can easily state A’s market share among
persons with income y as:8
˜ dP
A(y,g) =
¯ λ − ˜ λP
2¯ λ
. (28)





































which coincides with (14) except for γ 6= c and thus is solved by g = π · γ + ¯ λ.




¯ λ − ˜ λR
2¯ λ
, (30)
where ˜ λR is the critical level of loyalty for which indiﬀerence between both companies holds.
This level is implicitly deﬁned by:
π · u

(1 − τA)y + γ − c + ˜ λR

+ (1 − π) · u

(1 − τA)y + ˜ λR

= π · u

(1 − τB)y − c + d






8 This condition states the case of an interior solution, as must be the case in a symmetric solution. We
omit boundary solutions of market shares arising from suﬃciently high fee diﬀerentials in order to simplify
the exposition.A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 14



































the solution to which is analogous to (20):
˜ τ =

    















Partial insurance has no structural eﬀect on equilibrium fees and contribution rates in our
model. Hence, the comparison of consumer expenditures yields results identical to the case
of full insurance.
6 Conclusion
The analysis has shown that health insurance competition via contribution rates can be ﬁercer
than via premia. This result stands in contrast to popular conjectures in the literature and
in public debate.
Simple as it is, the model should not be misinterpreted such that contribution rates are
deﬁnitely preferable to premia. A number of aspects, which may tilt the balance in favor
of premia, like the eradication of implicit income taxation have not been incorporated to
the analysis. However, as many studies ﬁnd those aspects to be of mixed importance, the
decision over contribution rates versus fees as ﬁnancing instruments for health care appears
more delicate than presumed.
Important aspects neglected in the analysis are quality diﬀerentiation between suppliers and
private coinsurance. However, the signiﬁcance of these points varies among countries. While
public health care services are tightly standardized in Switzerland, Germany allows healthA Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 15
insurance companies to compete in both price and quality. In a model allowing for these
features, we expect the income-dependency of risk aversion to have an important bearing on
the ﬁndings. While we conjecture that our results go through when risk aversion is suﬃciently
low and not too decreasing in income, we leave a fully-ﬂedged analysis for future research.A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 16
Proof of Proposition 6
In order to prove that contribution rate competition implies lower consumer expenditures, a
comparison of company revenues is suﬃcient. These revenues amount to ˜ τµ and ˜ p respec-
tively.
Contribution rate competition is superior to premia competition if and only if ˜ p > ˜ τµ which
is deﬁnitely fulﬁlled when svc > ¯ λ/π · c. For svc ≤ ¯ λ/π · c, we have:
π · c + ¯ λ >
(π · c + ¯ λ)µ
µ(1 + svc)
⇐⇒ svc(π · c + ¯ λ) > 0 ⇐⇒ σ(π · c + ¯ λ) > 0.
Consumer welfare is higher under contribution rate competition as consumer expenditures
are lower in total and more progressively distributed than under premia competition.
Income dependent risks
In order to show that the right-hand side of (26) is negative when illness risk and income
are negatively correlated, we employ the following Lemma which is due to Eaton & Rosen
(1980).
Lemma: Given a random variable y with p.d.f. f(y) and support [a, b] and given a
function θ(y) with the property that there exists an y∗ ∈ [a,b] such that θ(y) > 0 for y > y∗
and θ(y) < 0 for y < y∗ , then, if
Z b
a
θ(y)f(y)dy = 0, (33)
the expression Z b
a
Θ(y)θ(y)f(y)dy < 0, (34)
if Θ(y) is uniformly decreasing.
Let a = y,b = y,y∗ = µ,θ(y) = ¯ π − π(y), such that the required properties and (33) hold.
Let Θ(y) = −y, so the left hand side of (34) coincides with the right-hand-side of (26). Since
Θ0(y) < 0, this right hand side must be negative according to the Lemma.A Simple Model of Health Insurance Competition 17
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